Political economy, water and the MDGs

Water resource management is critical for the achievement of many of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Too often, the political economy issues that determine whether or not water resources are managed effectively are overlooked. Drawing on research from the Lake Victoria region, ODI Research Officer Simon O’Meally argues in an opinion piece [1] for a greater focus on political economy issues in the drive to reach the MDGs that relate to water.

“Sustaining services continues to be a problem, and integrated water resources management (IWRM) remains
an aspiration rather than a reality. One reason for this is that current approaches to water resources management are devoid of politics – the missing piece of the water puzzle”, O’Meally writes.

O’Meally highlights three lessons from the World Bank-funded Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project (LVEMP):

Power and vested interests in water resources management – institutional and legal reforms were only enforced patchily. One reason was a lack of government capacity, but vested interests also hindered change, for example various lake-shore industries opposed stringent regulations on water pollution, calling instead for ‘voluntary’ standards. Enforcement problems were also linked to systems of political patronage. Such political economy insights can help practitioners to pinpoint the processes that hinder water reform and to devise strategic entry points to address these barriers. In this case, one entry point should be the support of mechanisms to involve a wider range of Lake Victoria ‘stakeholders’ in public financial planning.

Political contestation of ‘sustainable water management’ – ‘sustainable water management’ schemes also faced political economic obstacles – one of which was that ‘sustainable water management’ was highly contested. Contrary to some donor narratives, ‘sustainable development’ can mean different things to different actors, depending on their interests, values and ideology. Indeed, some blockages in LVEMP can be attributed to disagreements over what it meant to operationalise ‘sustainable water management’. Certain reforms were stalled because elites in Ministries of Finance prioritised economic growth
and macro-economic stabilisation, which conflicted with the goals of the more ‘conservationist’ elites
in Ministries of Water. Equally, various community organisations and front-line fishing communities resisted LVEMP schemes, arguing that there should be a major redistribution of water resource ownership before ‘sustainable’ resource use could be achieved. Collective action was hampered because the various groups did not have a shared goal to work towards. Practitioners should be aware that their approach is not politically neutral and may well be contested and resisted. By better appreciating this, practitioners can identify the actors who are likely to support, or oppose, their understanding of water management, and can promote consensus-building that goes ‘with the grain’ of political reality.

Knowledge: for whom and for what? Like many donors, the World Bank sees itself as a ‘technical’ agency (rather than a political actor) so it commissions scientific and economic water resource analyses. For LVEMP, most studies focused on ‘cataloguing’ natural resources, mapping pollution ‘hotspots’,
cost-benefit analyses and value-addition strategies. This knowledge can, to a degree, tell us where problems are and what could be done to solve them, but not how to make these recommendations a reality. Systematic political and socio-economic analysis is also needed to understand, for instance, why many of LVEMP’s findings were shelved and not integrated into political and policymaking processes, or why it is that many community groups resisted the co-management initiatives. Technical ‘soundness’ alone does not, it seems, guarantee political uptake.

This case suggests that astute political economy analysis has the potential to help donors improve the effectiveness of their water management assistance. Political economy is not, however, a panacea
and should complement, rather than replace, the more conventional development tools. But it is indispensable for identifying viable entry points for assistance, reducing the risk of doing harm and increasing the chances of success. In particular political economy could be used to unpick the political economic constraints on ‘sustainable’ water use, which is vital for meeting MDG 7.

[1] O’Meally, S. (2009). Political economy, water and the MDGs. (ODI opinion ; 136). London, UK, Overseas Development Institute. 2 p.

Read the full opinion piece

Public-private partnerships: evaluation of ADB’s performance in infrastructure

The Asian Development Bank’s support for public-private partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure development in general was rated “successful,” a special evaluation study concludes [1].  There are, however, areas for improvements for both, public sector and ADB’s Private Sector Operations Department (PSOD) operations, as implied by lower performance ratings in some specific areas and sectors.

For the water sector, the report recommends the PPP modalities that improve systems performance should be promoted. This means that the ADB should promote performance-based management contracts and affermages/leases, at least as strongly as the build-operate-transfer (BOT) type interventions. Decisions should be guided by the overall objective of minimizing investment and operating costs of the entire system and need to be sensitive to local political conditions and aspirations. Attracting private capital rather than achieving gains in technical, managerial, and allocative efficiencies is often wrongly perceived as the primary purpose of PPPs.

Since the 1990s, there is an increased use of PPP schemes that involve fiscal support to facilitate private sector participation (PSP) in water projects, which have had problems attracting private investment due to difficulties associated with predicting demand and charging cost-reflective tariffs.

ADB has implemented PPP in the water sector in many countries, including Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka in South Asia, and in Cambodia, China, Indonesia, and the Philippines in East Asia. ADB’s support has included technical assistance and policy dialogue for sector reforms and commercialisation of water utilities.

The report notes that two-thirds of approved PSOD water transactions had to be cancelled due to disputes between project promoters and authorities, limitations of the BOT modality, and unresolved tariff issues. This highlights PSOD’s particular difficulties in identifying viable transactions in this sector despite numerous attempts to become more engaged.

Opposition to change and fear of consequences (job losses, higher tariffs, loss of political control) and resistance by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) opposed to private sector entry have thwarted many attempts to introduce PPP, particularly in the water sector. The development of PPPs was also derailed in several countries, e.g., Indonesia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, due to changes in (local) government commitment. Sustained political will and support of key stakeholders is therefore seen as the ultimate determinant of PPP success.

[1] Feig, H. and Finlayson, B. (2009). ADB assistance for public-private partnerships in infrastructure development : potential for more success : evaluation study. Manila, The Philippines, Asian Development Bank. ix, 65 p. : fig., tab. 15 ref.
Download full report [PDF file]

Sanitation promotion: experiences from government-led initiative in southern Ethiopia

In Ethiopia’s Southern Nations Nationalities and People’s Region (SNNPR) an innovative programme has promoted latrine construction and use, hand washing and safe water storage and handling. The intervention is an example of how visionary government leadership can create the political momentum for low-cost sanitation and hygiene (S&H) and reach out to rural communities.

Papers from the Overseas Development Institute, in the UK, and the IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre, in the Netherlands investigate the SNNPR approach. The research was undertaken by Ethiopian researchers on behalf of the Research-inspired Policy and Practice Learning in Ethiopia and the Nile Region (RiPPLE) project.

[...] In 2003 the SNNPR Bureau of Health (BoH) began a new community health strategy, including S&H [which aimed] to reach households through paid health extension workers (HEWs) and volunteer community health promoters (CHWs) [and which] promoted latrine construction without any form of subsidy.

A combination of political promotion and institutional mobilisation was successful in launching and expanding the regional government’s strategy as a ‘movement’. [...] The key elements of the S&H strategy were designed to be politically attractive and administratively feasible, and were written in non-technical language.

The researchers found after the project:

• The proportion of households having latrines increased by a factor of eight.
• There was less acceptance of open defecation.
• Questionnaire results indicated better knowledge on hand washing, although actual practice remained poor.
• There were hand washing facilities in 82 percent of households, but only 6 percent were near the household latrine and few people used soap or detergents.
• Water storage and handling practices also remained poor.
• Men mostly decided latrine design, siting and construction, although women were involved in providing materials and plastering.

Despite these positive developments, doubts remain about sustainability and some latrines have collapsed [and] many are infested with flies. As CHWs are unpaid and receive little follow-up support or training, many have lost motivation. Higher levels of government have not provided enough technical support or monitored changes in household S&H behaviour.

[...] Aspects of the SNNPR experience which might help improve [sanitation elsewhere] include:

• promoting local, rather than donor-driven, S&H programmes and technology designs
• using community promotional change agents coordinated by local authorities in command and facilitation roles
• reviewing local S&H progress within wider health sector review processes
• ensuring that strategising, political positioning and communication are based on solid evidence
• realising that sanitation workers cannot make their case to high-level politicians without understanding the political dynamics around S&H.

Source: id21, 01 Apr 2009

Strengthening accountability for improved service delivery: SNV’s local capacity development approach

Todd, B. (2008). Strengthening accountability for improved service delivery :  SNV’s local capacity development approach. The Hague, The Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 15 p. Download here

Better accountability improves service delivery performance. Based on more than twenty-five case studies in over twelve countries, this paper describes the attempts of SNV Netherlands Development Organisation to strengthen the accountability capacity of citizens, government and service providers. Breaking accountability down into five actions, it examines a number of strategies that have produced good results. It finds multi-stakeholder approaches particularly valid and highlights the critical need to empower citizens, especially marginalised groups. Greater investment in developing the accountability capacity of local actors to delegate, finance, perform, inform and enforce, can produce significant improvements in service delivery.

While accountability is not a silver bullet, it is a powerful driver of change and improved performance. To really improve service delivery, it needs to be accompanied by other elements (such as increased resources, improved infrastructure and equipment, better technical capacity and internal reforms), which all are complementary to building capacity for greater accountability.

Examples of SNV”s work in the water sector mentioned in the paper are:

• Capacity building support for the Public Health Engineering Division of the Bhutanese Ministry of Health has resulted in an increase in drinking water coverage from 45% in 1990 to 85% in 2005. The service provider has adopted and institutionalised participatory approaches to community operation and maintenance, and to hygiene education, which communities have enthusiastically supported.

• In collaboration with the Water Resources Development Bureau in southern Ethiopia, SNV designed and supported a comprehensive governance and service delivery assessment of household access to safe water. The survey motivated the Bureau to rehabilitate 16 water schemes in two months and improve water access for 1,600 households. It also generated long-term, institutional momentum for continuous improvement.

• SNV has been working with municipal water companies in Ecuador, Honduras and Nicaragua to enhance efficiency, quality of services and sustainability through organisational development, integrated management and improved local water governance. This has helped to establish the conditions for sustainable and improved service delivery for about 355,000 people in urban areas and has created opportunities for improved livelihoods for about 210,000 rural dwellers.

• Service providers in Ghana are delegated huge responsibilities which can only be fulfilled through better coordination and collaboration with all stakeholders. In the northern capital of Tamale, the service provider can only guarantee water supply for two to three days a week. A multi-stakeholder consultation process facilitated by SNV agreed that the key to improvement lies in a new water governance system. This will involve delegating some of the service provider’s responsibilities to decentralised and non-state local providers. [...] The lesson learned is that, even within a weak institutional environment at national level, it is possible to improve performance at local level through better leadership, partnership and coordination.

Water distribution: small piped water networks as a long-term solution in Viet Nam

Tien Giang Province’s small towns, deemed unserviceable by major water utilities, found a permanent solution to their big water problem in small piped water networks.

When Viet Nam’s Tien Giang Province was selected as project site for piloting small piped water networks (SPWNs) [in 2005], it was on the premise that these small piped systems would provide a short-term, interim solution to the province’s water problem. The more permanent solution-connections from the water company with its huge pipes-has long been overdue.

SPWPs, which are businesses owned by persons or small organizations, were able to get water to more than 2,500 people within three months.

[...] Whether by fluke of circumstance or by incredible insight on the part of Viet Nam’s legislation, Decree 117, which reconsidered water’s status from a social good to a business commodity, was passed in August 2007 while the pilot projects were in progress. The decree opened up the entire sector to change-high and upfront connections were done away with, water connections were offered free or on flexible 12-month installment schemes to the extremely poor, and water tariffs were adjusted.

[...] SPWNs [...] were also environmentally beneficial, as they put an end to uncontrolled well-drilling that can lead to soil subsidence and groundwater table pollution.

[...] In Viet Nam’s case at least, SPWNs do not offer interim solutions-they are the permanent solution to bringing piped water connections to poor households and communities.

Source: Cezar Tigno, ADB, Dec 2008

Sri Lanka: “swings and roundabouts” in water policy development

“In recent decades, policy reforms for water resource management nationally -demanded but designed by external actors – have generated intense controversy and become both a tool and a victim of national politics”, says Rajindra Ariyabandu in a new ODI working paper [1]. Ariyabandu tells the “tells the difficult story of a set of Asian Development Bank (ADB) projects in the 1990s which were designed to streamline water resource management arrangements and introduce demand management to the country. In spite of a decade of investment and effort these arrangements have never been implemented. This failure is largely attributable to a lack of understanding of the Sri Lankan context: a multi-party system with governments often held together in fragile coalitions, strong cultural values attached to water, a vocal civil society fearful of water privatisation and a politicised media willing to exploit controversies”. In 2004, the ADB suspended funding to the Comprehensive Water Resources Management (CWRM) project, which it had supported since its inception in 1992.

[1] Ariyabandu, R. (2008). Swings and roundabouts : a narrative on water policy development in Sri Lanka. (Working paper / ODI ; 296). London, UK, Overseas Development Institute. vi, 18 p. ISBN 978 0 85003 890 3. Download here

Project Performance and the Project Cycle: lessons from the Asian Development Bank

Despite a general trend to higher numbers of projects being rated successful or better over the past few years, about 30% of ADB’s project portfolio of the Asian Devlopment Bank (ADB) is still rated less than successful during the evaluation phase.

In order to better understand why this happens, a business practices study was undertaken to look at project performance in the project cycle.

The retrospective analysis was able to determine 17 common factors which affected project success. The most frequently occurring of these factors were deficient capacity-building and ownership measures during project design, insufficient or deficient supervision by ADB during project implementation, less than rigorous ADB internal review, and inadequate technical analysis or inappropriate project design.

Based on an analysis of each stage of the project cycle, three main issues were highlighted:

1. Overloading of the Project Team Leader
Recommendation. Project teams have been less than effective in adequately supporting the project team leaders. Management should continue to explore modalities for strengthening team work (including through appropriate incentives) to have better burden sharing in teams.

2. Budgetary Support not Commensurate with Expanding PPTA (project preparatory technical assistance) Scope
Recommendation. Management should review PPTA funding requirements in light of the current and future scope of PPTAs and ensure the necessary PPTA funds.

3. Need for Greater Project Supervision to Avoid Implementation Delays
Recommendation. Current resource allocation for project implementation supervision should be reexamined for adequacy. Start-up delay, which is a common feature for most projects, should receive special attention, and adequate resources should be made available including thorough flexible use of TA and loan funds and/or greater internal human resource allocation.

Read the full ADB report (September 2008)

Lessons for out-scaling and Up-scaling from DFID’s RNRRS Studies and Research

Key lessons for up-scaling and out-scaling of DFID research

Authors: W. Richards; Research Into Use Programme, DFID
Publisher: Department for International Development, UK, 2008

Full text of document

This report consists of a series of short syntheses which bring together key lessons for up-scaling and out-scaling research based on 19 key reviews, summaries and reports detailing DFID natural resources research. Each synthesis provides background information and key points, while the lessons learned are illustrated using examples and case studies.

Key lessons learned include:

• Start from what’s on the ground: most successes in spreading the uptake of research findings came about when the people involved understood  what was happening on the ground, including indigenous  knowledge on practices and processes, and worked with it. This is true at the local level, in communities, and at administrative and government levels.
• Understand the key players and build relationships: starting from what is on the ground leads to an understanding of who the key players and local champions  are, and how they operate. This mapping of institutions and understanding of their roles in a network are pre-requisites for deciding who we need to invite to join ‘coalitions’ (ie the groups of people and organisations who get
  together to out-scale or up-scale research findings). Understanding what they want and where they are coming from also helps build trust and relationships with them.
• Be realistic about what can be achieve: sometimes one has to face up to the fact that the conditions for uptake of research findings just aren’t  conducive. For example, experience shows that any innovation in developing countries where innovation frameworks and infrastructure are weak is tough. Outscaling and up-scaling research findings have a better chance of success where governments have encouraged
• Partner, communicate, advocate and build capacity strategically: an understanding of the local context, the key players and what can realistically be achieved will help develop clear strategies for ‘how’-partnering, communicating, advocating and building skills-out-scaling and up-scaling will be achieved. adoption of new technologies by, for example, supporting producer prices, subsidising inputs and credit for new technologies, and investing in irrigation, roads and marketing systems.
• Capture your own learning and learn from others: it is essential to capture  opportunities to learn and share learning with others. Learning what works and what does not is going to be vital in out-scaling and up-scaling. A good way to capture lessons learned is through a formal system of monitoring and evaluation that emphasises learning rather than accountability.

However, one size does not fit all. The lessons learned will be worked, reworked and adapted by practitioners to different  situations.

Source: ELDIS

Aid effectiveness in the water sector: lessons from Bangladesh, Uganda and Ethiopia

A study by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) reviewed the extent to which the five Paris Principles (PPs) on Aid Effectiveness (AE) as set out in the Paris Declaration (PD) on AE: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability, are being applied in the water and sanitation sector. Comparisons were made between the water, health and education sectors.

The approach included in-depth case study research in three countries (Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Uganda) and a broader document review. From this evidence the study aims to identify ways in which external support to the water sector can be delivered more in the spirit of the PD.

ODI found that the water sector was not consistently underperforming in the three country case studies. Rather, situation is one of ‘fluid dynamics’ – the sector is moulded by the surrounding political-economic context in which it is situated, i.e. predominantly by the national governance environments in the countries examined.

The following conclusions and recommendations emerged:

1. The broader governance environment is a more important influence on progress against the Paris Principles than sector characteristics. Aspects of the governance context beyond the sector, rather than sector characteristics alone, are a key influence on progress.

2. The perception that the water sector is lagging behind is not supported if the spirit rather than the mechanics of the PD is considered. SWAPs or other instruments should not be seen as a one-off step but rather as an ongoing dynamic process, a platform for learning for both donors and recipients. The pace and level of engagement depends on the opportunities at hand in a given situation provided by the prevailing politicaleconomic context.

3. Some dynamics are specific to particular (sub-) sectors and require a more targeted approach. The type and number of actors and type and levels of financing differs between
sectors. The water sector is likely to be more affected for instance by new donors such as China with a particular emphasis on infrastructure development while the health
sector stands out for receiving high levels of aid from private foundations and multilateral funding initiatives.

4. Some aspects of system alignment such as PFM and procurement cut across sectors. Engagement at a higher level than the sector may be more effective than trying to find solutions within a sector.

5. Paucity of data prevents the measurement of progress against the PP for AE at sector level. There is
also currently no evidence that the fulfilment of the PP leads to better development outcomes e.g. increased access to WSS.

Welle, K. … [et al.] (2008). Fluid dynamics? : achieving greater progress on aid effectiveness in the water
sector – lessons from three countries : final report to the Department for International Development. London, UK, Overseas Development Institute. 57 p. Read full report

A shorterned version of this paper was published in 2009 in Water Alternatives:

Welle, K.; Tucker, J.; Nicol, A. and Evans, B. 2009. Is the water sector lagging behind education and health on aid effectiveness? : lessons from Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Uganda. Water Alternatives ; vol. 2, no. 3 ; p. 297‐314. Full article

Strengthening the Regulatory Framework for Water Supply and Sanitation in Sri Lanka

As part of its program, the Government of Sri Lanka embarked in 2001-2002 in the preparation of a series of sector reforms to improve its capacity to provide for new investments and improve the operation and maintenance of existing ones.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) provided technical assistance (TA) to:
(i) developing adequate legislation and guidelines to regulate the water sector, and
(ii) developing institutional capacity for regulatory legislation and guidelines.

Although the TA was to be completed in 2004, political changes delayed work, which could only be resumed in 2006.

Based on the feedback from Government agencies, and an ADB evaluation, including sustainability issues, the TA was considered successful.

The main lessons were:

1. Political commitment to reform remains the single major element to achieving independent regulation. Although interest and dedication is noted in professional circles, major decision-makers at minister level are distancing themselves. In the absence of a more firm response to reform initiatives, ADB’s operations in the sector may need to consider alternative agencies (such as local government) and revise its strategy accordingly.

2. Objectives and scope of TAs involving sector reform need to incorporate sufficient flexibility to accommodate changes in Government’s strategies. The TORs should be adapted to enable easy adjustment as ground realities and needs evolve.

Read the full TA completion report here

For a link to the full report go here