Community-Led Total Sanitation: breaking a dirty old habit in Bangladesh

Dinajpur district residents have stopped defecating in the open because of the children’s total sanitation campaign that follows a radical community-led approach.

A procession of children march through a village in Dinajpur demanding an end to open defecation. Photo: Pal Bangladesh

Whistle blowing is a favorite pastime among children in the villages of Dinajpur district in northern Bangladesh. They would blow their whistles when they spot fellow villagers, often adults, defecating in the open, chasing the surprised offenders who would then pull their pants up and attempt to escape the noise and humiliation. [...] Within 6 months, they shamed some 250 people from different villages. Besides the whistling and flag-marking, the children also march around villages, chanting slogans against open defecation (OD), sending a direct message to all villagers about the dirty old habit.

The children’s involvement in this direct action against OD is part of the Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS), “an integrated approach to achieving and sustaining open defecation free status.” The children know that their efforts help protect their own and their communities’ health, and adults include them in community decision-making.

[...] Designed by social development specialist Dr. Kamal Kar, CLTS was introduced by Plan, an international development agency, to some 200 villages in Dinajpur in 2004.

[...] In CLTS, hands-off facilitation is important. The rule of thumb for social development facilitators is to trigger self-realization, and not to lecture. Instant provision of hardware-latrines or toilets-are also discouraged. Villagers have to realize first that the problem is staring at them right in the face. The CLTS approach helps communities recognize that they need such sanitation facilities, that they should mobilize themselves to build their own toilets, and that everyone in the village should contribute to achieve “total sanitation.”

[...] Today, most Dinajpur villages have achieved “open defecation free” (ODF) status and, thanks to Plan’s efforts, a number of villages in several districts have also adopted the CLTS approach.

The children’s campaign is the just the beginning. CLTS allows villagers to generate their own ideas for improvement, take control of development processes and decision-making, and manage and sustain the activities. Often, CLTS has led to improving latrine designs, adopting hygienic practices, managing solid waste and wastewater, protecting drinking water sources, and other environmental activities.

Some villagers, however, can prove to be more difficult than others. Ferdousi said, “Two years to convert everyone is not enough, but we will keep on raising awareness.”

Plan now promotes CLTS in other countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. A CLTS Handbook, published in 2008, is also available for social development facilitators.

Related web site: Community-led Total Sanitation – Bangladesh

See also: Whistle blowers put a stop to open defecation, Plan Bangladesh, 28 Mar 2008

Source: Cezar Tigno, ADB, Jan 2009

Community kiosks: learning from water supply failures in Malawi

The Lilongwe Water Board is the sole water supply authority in Malawi’s capital city. However, its service suffered from inadequate response to system and community problems and lack of transparency in water billing. In response to a request for assistance from the community, WaterAid Malawi developed a strategic partnership with the Lilongwe Water Board, aimed at improving management of water services in unplanned low-income neighbourhoods.

An [April 2008] paper from WaterAid Malawi describes its partnership with the Lilongwe Water Board and a local non-governmental organisation – the Centre for Community Organization and Development (CCODE).

WaterAid research indicated that the system to distribute water through water kiosks was not working. Poor households owed huge sums to the Lilongwe Water Board – the monopoly water provider. They were paying far too much: prices at communal kiosks in low-income areas were twice as high as those in high-income areas. Charging systems were inconsistent and billing was not transparent. Some households paid equal monthly fees for different levels of consumption while others were paying per bucket.

Political and traditional leaders corruptly controlled kiosk management committees and failed to pass on funds they collected from communities to the Lilongwe Water Board. The private operators who were able to pay their utility bills resold water to poor people at high and unregulated tariffs. Many meters were vandalised but even those still working were often not read for over a year. The water board charged customers for estimated, not actual, consumption. Without consultation with users, the utility factored in arrears into water bills to cover money misused by community leaders.

Further problems included: illegal installation of boreholes, failure to check water quality, dependence of on unsafe sources when kiosks were disconnected, high leakage rates

[Following a reform programme] the utility now regards itself as a public service provider with obligations to consult users and to extend the network to unserved communities, while also embracing private sector principles to improve the efficiency of billing, debt collection and reduction of water losses.

Reform has also involved:

• establishing a focal point within the Lilongwe Water Board to whom community kiosk users could take their grievances: the Kiosk Management Unit regulates prices and promotes timely reporting of faults and prompt action to fix them
• WaterAid providing technical and financial advice and funding to rehabilitate communal water kiosks, replace meters, construct meter boxes and improve drainage facilities at kiosks
• building CCODE’s capacity to mobilise communities’ capacities to identify kiosk management options, settle debts, monitor the utility and promote hygiene education.

Source: id21, 01 March 2009

Urban water supply: potential of pro-poor water connection subsidies in Cambodia

After decades of conflict, Cambodian water planners are struggling to provide supplies to urban residents. Many households do not use water from a network connection. Instead they rely on dirty and unreliable sources. Getting poor householders connected is unlikely without subsidies and regulatory reform.

A new journal article [...] uses household data from a range of Cambodian urban settings to assess the demand for water and identify the main factors determining household access to network water.

[O]utside the capital {Phnom Penh] the urban [water] coverage rate is only 15 percent. Many people obtain their water from rivers, streams, tanks, wells or private vendors [who charge] prices that are usually about ten times higher than the official rate.

[...] An examination of 200 household variables and price data reveals that:

• Educational attainment levels are higher among connected households compared to non-connected ones.
• Members of an ethnic (mainly Chinese) minority are more likely to be connected compared to the majority Khmer group.
• Connected households have significantly greater assets than non-connected ones: a household with a telephone is 33 percent more likely to be connected than a household without a telephone.
• A one percent increase in the water connection fee reduces the probability of a household getting connected by about two-fifths.

The researchers advise policymakers – in Cambodia and other developing countries – to use targeted subsidies to encourage more poor households to connect. Once they are connected even the less well-off households may be able to afford a non-subsidised tariff. This advice is based on growing evidence that with targeted connection subsidies, the probability of excluding a deserving household is significantly smaller than with a general consumption subsidy. Poorer households are often willing to pay more for water and sanitation services than what they cost to operate and maintain.

The [article urges] the Cambodian authorities to:

• better manage existing resources aimed at the provision of safe water targeted at the poorest, which could then provide the financial resources for a connection subsidy programme
• discuss with donors and concession operators how to finance a connection subsidy programme
• in addition to connection subsidies, consider other factors to improve service access and provision, such as developing sound regulations for the sector
• give an autonomous regulator a clear remit to promote accountability, transparency and competition between the public and private sectors
• undertake research comparing the efficiency of the private and public sectors
• generate data regarding the welfare effects associated with connection to and use of a water system.

Full reference: [1] Basani, M., Isham, J. and Reilly, B. (2008), The determinants of water connection and water consumption : empirical evidence from a Cambodian household survey. World development ; vol. 36, no. 5 ; p. 953-96. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.04.021. Read the full article here.

Source: id21, 01 March 2009

Urban sanitation: putting people at the centre of informal settlement upgrading in Pakistan

The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) has transformed sewage systems in low income, informal settlements (‘katchi abadi’), where 60 percent of Karachi’s population lives. OPP has challenged development approaches, which are very technical and overly-dependent on government and donor support. Such approaches treat poor communities as objects, rather than drivers, of development.

A report for the International Institute for Environment and Development, in the UK, explores how OPP has expanded from a focus on the ‘katchi abadi’ of Orangi to become an important voice on issues related to sewerage, drainage sanitation and informal settlement upgrading across Karachi.

[...] OPP has achieved credibility over years of rigorous mapping and documentation. [...]. OPP’s model of low-cost sanitation gives residents the responsibility of building household and lane-level sanitation infrastructure. Municipal authorities are responsible for building and maintaining secondary infrastructure. [...] Infant mortality rates have declined dramatically.

[...] In order to ensure individuals are driven by ideals, not [...] financial reward, OPP salaries are lower than those of other NGOs.  [...] OPP does not seek large-scale funding from donors. High standards of openness and financial transparency are central to building relationships. Staff numbers are kept low by training community members as activists and mappers, and encouraging them to work themselves.

OPP rejects all form of subsidy, believing it inevitably leads to dependence [and] increases costs and causes waste. When the community contributes towards a project – [..] costs are immediately cut: designs are simplified, methods of construction are cost-efficient, and profiteering, kickbacks and professional fees for contractors, engineers and supervisors are eliminated.

OPP’s experience shows that:

• It important to work on a single issue – or only a small number of issues – comprehensively before taking on related issues.
• In order to influence government it is vital not to be confrontational: it is necessary to work patiently over a period of time with department staff and build trusting relationships with civil servants.
• Meticulous documentation of findings, observations and processes, leading to the preparation of alternatives is critical to being taken seriously by decision-makers.

Source: id21, 01 March 2009